Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Seen Through So Holy's avatar

Just so you know, I wouldn't lay it all on the line without a deep love for the exploited, downtrodden, nad vulnerable people around the world. I wouldnt mention it without you mentioning "No Love" achieved. I see love very different then you. Maybe you mean intimacy, a way of showing love to a specific person(s). I think putting it on the line knowing:

- you have the privilege to have a voice, your "struggle" was unknown

- situation pales in comparison to the individuals let alone totality of those in worse situations

- can take a few lickens and keep on ticking

I think it requires love. I guess you could think its to get something or my rightful whatever, but its not. I would even consider a self termination love as I would do it to force yall to sovle the problems at hand because in the end I think you have the means an the will to do it and the process, albeit bloodier, provides invaluable learning and growth that me solving is devoid of. I wont fight for something that I was born with, I will exit stage right cause i think I have been used to bully the world and am part of the problem simply existing. Sad sad days, but keep your head up.

Expand full comment
urocom's avatar

Questions

1. What is the paper supporting that “Actually, given either sufficient room for miscommunication and mistakes, or a sufficiently asymmetrical reward matrix, GTFT loses to pure Lucifer (exploit everyone) strategies”?

2. By the Nash Folk Theorem, it is only possible for cooperation strategies like Tit-for-Tat if PD is iterated sequentially infinite number of times. If the PD is repeated for a finite number of times, we can find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). A Nash Equilibrium is called subgame perfect if after each round of the game that passes, your Nash Equilibrium strategy still serves as a Nash Equilibrium for the game that's left to play.

Given in that our interactions in real life are cannot last infinitely, what are the implications of us never reaching an Nash Equilibrium of efficiency ?

3. Your rule 3 - "After you retaliate, always try to co-operate again in the next round" seems to be different from the typical ‘Generous Tit for Tat’ (GTFT), in which a player begins with forgiveness and, once defected against, only defects back a certain percentage of the time, giving the defector a better chance to redeem themselves (Kay 2013).

Do you think your Rule 3 will differ in success from GTFT?

Expand full comment

No posts